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The last two decades have witnessed the complete or parital privatization of public
pension systems in several countries, and many proposals have been made to privatize the U.S.
Social Security system either completely or partially.  The motivation behind such proposals is
that privatization will lead to substantial long-run welfare gains due to an increase in the
economy’s  steady-state capital stock.  This buildup of capital requires lower consumption or
greater work effort during the short run, however, so that transition generations might suffer
welfare losses.  Previous analyses of the transition to privatized social security using large-scale,
computable, overlapping generations models have generally confirmed both large long-run
welfare gains and substantial welfare losses during the transition.  This paper uses such a model
to explore the characteristics that a reform proposal must have if it is to avoid welfare losses in
the short run.  Using reasonable parameter values, it claims that a Pareto-improving transition to
privatized social security is feasible.1  The equivalence between unfunded social security and public debt has been noted by Miller and Upton
(1974, chapter 8), Feldstein (1974, 1976), and Barro (1974, 1976).  Earlier discussions of the burden of the public debt
are contained in Modigliani (1961) and Diamond (1965).
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Can Social Security Privatization Be Pareto Improving?
1.  Introduction
The last two decades have witnessed the complete or partial privatization of public
pension systems in several countries, and many proposals have been made to privatize the U.S.
Social Security system either completely or partially.  The principal motivation behind such
proposals is that privatization of the U.S. system would lead to substantial long-run welfare gains
due to an increase in the economy’s capital stock.  Like government debt, unfunded social
security promises currently living individuals an income stream to be financed by future taxes,
some of which will fall on individuals not yet born.  In a model populated by pure life-cycle
consumers or those with sufficiently weak altruism toward future generations, the promises
entailed by either government debt or unfunded social security reduce private saving and depress
the steady-state capital stock.
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The depressing effect of unfunded social security on the capital stock could be avoided
either by eliminating social security entirely or by moving to a funded system.  Funding, in turn,
can be accomplished either by replacing the unfunded system with a system of mandatory private
retirement accounts or by maintaining a centralized system but having the government
accumulate sufficient assets to pay all benefits promised to current participants.  In principle, any
of these reforms would result in a long-run increase in the capital stock.  Complete elimination of
the system might nevertheless be undesirable because of moral hazard issues of the sort
considered by Diamond (1977).  Because government control of a large portfolio of private assets
might entail a different range of problems, most proposals for U.S. Social Security reform have
focused on a system of mandatory private accounts.
The overall welfare effects of funding the system remain unclear, whatever the means
chosen to achieve it.  While funding would result in a larger capital stock, it would also require2
lower consumption during the transition to the new steady state, so that transition generations
might suffer welfare losses.
Several previous analyses of the transition to funded social security using large-scale,
computable, overlapping generations models have confirmed both large long-run welfare gains
and substantial welfare losses during the transition.  Huang, ⁄mrohoro￿lu, and Sargent (1997)
model both a fully funded, centralized system and complete elimination of social security.  They
find that both transitions result in substantial short-run welfare losses before the eventual long-run
gains are realized.  Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1999) consider various methods of
handling the transition to a fully funded system.  They find that all result in short-run welfare
losses that reach a maximum for the hardest-hit cohorts of between two and four percent of
consumption of a composite of market goods and leisure.  Nishiyama (2002) models a proposal
similar to one contained in the report of the President’s Commission on Social Security in 2001. 
This proposal calls for a system of individual accounts that would partially replace the current
unfunded system.   Like the earlier studies, he finds substantial short-run welfare losses followed
by long-run gains.  On the other hand, Feldstein and Samwick (1998), who do not use such an
explicit model, calculate much smaller transition costs.
The natural question arises as to whether it is possible to manage the transition to a fully
or partially privatized social security system in such a way that no cohort has lower welfare than
under the current system.  It is not at all obvious that such Pareto-improving reforms are possible. 
To see why, consider the following simple example.  Suppose that in a two-period overlapping
generations model the government at date  t = 0   makes an aggregate transfer of  D0  to the old
generation.  How should this transfer be financed, both intertemporally and intratemporally?  A
plausible and arguably equitable intertemporal allocation would be to spread the burden of the
initial transfer uniformly across all future generations.  This could be accomplished by issuing an
initial amount of government debt equal to  D0  and letting this debt grow at the economy’s
aggregate growth rate,  g,  so as to maintain a constant debt-GDP ratio over time.  If the real
interest rate is  r  (> g), then this policy would require collecting incremental tax revenue of 
(r – g)Dt  every period to cover debt-service payments, which would remain constant over time as
a fraction of income.  Intratemporally, it would be efficient to collect the revenue for debt-service
payments through lump-sum taxes if these were available.  In the absence of lump-sum taxes,
distorting taxes would be required instead.2  This is a reasonable characterization of the evolution of U.S. Social Security.    Although the original
intent was to establish a funded system (Miron and Weil, 1998), funding was for various reasons continually deferred. 
As a consequence, cohorts alive at the time the system began operation in the late 1930s received positive net transfers,
while cohorts born later made net contributions.  See Figure 4 in Geanakoplos, Mitchell, and Zeldes (1999).
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Now consider financing the initial transfer by setting up an unfunded social security
system.
2  Such a system would impose a payroll tax that would collect  D0  from the initial young
and the same fraction of the earnings of each future generation.  The initial young would collect
social security benefits of   D1 = (1 + g)D0  during retirement, which is less than the amount 
(1 + r)D0  that they would have received had their payroll taxes been invested in assets.  Thus, the
transfer imposes a cost of  (r – g)D0  on the first generation of workers, and this cost remains
constant as a fraction of earnings from one cohort to the next.  The resulting intertemporal pattern
of cash flows is the same as under the “fair” intertemporal allocation implemented through
government debt.  
Unfunded social security collects  (r – g)Dt  from each cohort to service the debt implicit
in the system.  This implicit debt service can be viewed as a tax on each cohort’s “assets” in the
system.  Unlike most taxes on income from capital, however, this implicit tax does not distort the
margin between consumption and saving since, conditional on earnings, each worker’s
contributions to the system are mandatory.  The marginal rate of return to saving is still the after-
tax rate of return on assets.  Any distortions are to the margin between consumption and leisure. 
These distortions could arise for a variety of reasons.  First, additional contributions during
working years  might lead to a less than one-for-one increase in the present value of benefits
received during old age.  This would be the case if benefits increase less than proportionately
with lifetime contributions (as is the case in the U.S. system) or if the implicit return of  g  on
contributions is less than the after-tax discount rate.  Second, if the system is overly generous and
consumers face binding borrowing constraints (rendering simple present value calculations
inappropriate), then an incremental dollar of income during working years might yield a larger
increase in lifetime utility than would an increase in future benefits equal to one dollar in present
value (Hubbard and Judd, 1987).
Despite these labor market distortions, the U.S. Social Security payroll tax nevertheless
possesses certain efficiency properties compared with the income tax (Barro and Sahasakul,
1986).  First, it is a tax on labor income rather than income from capital, and heavy taxation of4
income from capital might be inefficient (Chamley, 1981; Judd, 1987).  Second, the payroll tax is
a flat-rate tax on earnings below a cutoff amount, after which the marginal tax rate is zero.  Thus,
it is in effect a lump-sum tax for high-income workers.  Finally, the existence of even a partial
linkage between current contributions and future benefits mitigates the distortion of the labor
supply decision.
Privatization of social security involves altering either the intertemporal or intratemporal
properties (or both) of the mechanism used to of finance the transfer to the initial elderly.  In
particular, a reduction in the payroll tax means that the inflows to a pay-as-you-go system are no
longer sufficient to pay promised benefits.  This revenue shortfall implies transition costs that can
be borne either by current participants in the system in the form of benefit reductions or by some
cohorts (possibly the same ones) in the form of increases in other taxes.  Given the efficiency
properties noted above, the Social Security payroll tax might constitute as close a substitute for a
lump-sum tax as is feasible.  If so, then any reform that uses more distorting income taxes would
tend to increase the welfare costs of the transfer to the initial elderly.  If the transition costs of
privatization are financed entirely by a permanent increase in the steady-state debt-GDP ratio,
then privatization has no first-order effect on the intertemporal allocation of the burden of the
intial transfer.  If the transition costs are financed exclusively through such an explicit debt issue, 
then one would expect little or no change in the steady-state capital intensity, and utilization of
more highly distorting income taxes to cover the resulting explicit debt-service payments might
well leave individuals worse off than under pay-as-you-go social security.  Alternatively,
financing a portion of the transition costs by higher taxes during the transition might might permit
steady-state welfare gains but leave the transition cohorts worse off.  In other words, it is an open
question whether Pareto improvements are possible as a result of social security privatization.
This paper employs a 65-period overlapping generations model populated by pure life-
cycle consumers (described in section 2) to explore the possibility of Pareto-improving social
security privatization.  To provide the clearest illustration of the general issues involved, the
model is first applied to an economy in which all individuals are identical at birth and both the
population growth rate and the age distribution of the population are stationary (section 4 and 5). 
This economy begins in a steady state with an unfunded social security system much like that
currently existing in the United States (characterized numerically in section 3) and moves to a5
new steady state with a smaller system.  This set of experiments indicates that Pareto-improving
reforms are possible.
The next set of experiments (not yet completed) considers the more complicated situation
in which the demographics evolve much as they have in the United States since World War II but
in which all individuals are still identical at birth.  The third set of experiments (also not
completed) considers distributional issues by assuming that individuals fall at birth into one of the
12 skill types modeled by Kotlikoff, Smetters, and Walliser (1999).
2.  The Model
This paper employs a variant of the discrete-time, overlapping generations model of
⁄mrohoro￿lu, ⁄mrohoro￿lu, and Joines (2003).  The current model differs from that one in only
three important respects.  First, individuals in the earlier model faced  idiosyncratic earnings risk
which is absent in the current model.  Second, individuals in the earlier model could supply
positive labor hours up through the last period of life, whereas the current model has a mandatory
retirement age.  This is assumed to be the age at which individuals first become eligible to collect
social security benefits in the initial steady state, and it remains unchanged by any social security
reform.  Finally, all individuals in this paper have time-consistent preferences.
Demographics
At each date  t,  a new cohort is born that is  n  percent larger than the previous cohort. 
Age is denoted by  j,  and  j = 1  in the first period of life.  Cohorts are indexed by  i,  which is
equal to the calendar date corresponding to the first period of life.  The relation between date,
cohort, and age is given by  t = i + j – 1.  In general, a variable needs to be subscripted by only
two of these three indices.  Variables that change over the life cycle but are stationary from one
cohort to the next are indexed only by age.  Aggregates describing the entire economy, including
market-clearing factor prices, are indexed only by time.
Among these startionary variables are those describing the demographic evolution of the
economy.  Individuals face long but random lives and some live through age  J,  the maximum3  Given the form of the utility function, the nonnegativity constraint on consumption is never binding.  The
zero constraint on labor is also redundant if the efficiency index   is calibrated to equal zero for   j e
*. jj ‡
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possible life span.  Life-span uncertainty is described by   ,  the conditional probability of j y
surviving from age  j-1  to  j.  Both  n  and     are assumed to be time-invariant.  Under this j y
stationarity assumption, the cohort shares are also time-invariant and are given by
1
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Individual Preferences and Budget Constraints
Preferences are standard.  An individual of cohort  i  maximizes the utility derived from
























where  is the subjective discount factor. b
Individuals choose   their holdings of  “ordinary” assets at the end of age  ,, and , ijijij ca l
j,  to maximize lifetime utility subject to a sequence of one-period budget constraints
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Here   is a time-invariant but age-specific labor efficiency index.  The market-clearing wage j j
rate and rate of return at date  t  are denoted by    and    respectively.  The other time-specific t w , t r
variable is    a  lump-sum transfer payment received by all individuals alive at date  t.   , t j
denotes the social security benefit received by members of cohort  i,  and     denotes a  ij B ij P
pension from mandatory individual retirement accounts.  Both variables are constant for ages




is the sum of explicit taxes
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rate taxes on consumption, income from ordinary assets, and labor income, respectively.  Note
that these tax rates may vary over time but are the same for all cohorts at any date.  Social
security contributions are the product of a flat contribution rate   and the larger of an
s
t t
individual’s earnings and a time-specific amount of wage income denoted     The four terms on . t w




Mandatory contributions to individual retirement accounts are given by 
  Note that the upper limit on the contribution base is assumed to be 111 max(,).
p
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the same for social security and mandatory private accounts.  These contributions are not
deductible from taxable earnings and returns on assets held in retirement accounts are not taxed. 
Upon retirement, the account balance is used to purchase an actuarially fair annuity that makes a
fixed periodic payment of    until the individual dies.  These annuity payments are not subject i B4  This assumption is in line with historical experience in the U.S. system, where amendments enacted over
time have incorporated differential changes in various rules governing benefits for different cohorts.
5  Allowing the transfer payment to change amounts to assuming that the government has access to lump-
sum taxes, an assumption ruled out below when considering financing the transition to a new steady state after reform
of the social security system.
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to income taxation, although any consumption they finance is taxed at the ordinary consumption
tax rate.
While the parameters governing contributions to the social security system are assumed
to be constant across cohorts at a given date, the benefit formula may vary from one cohort to the
next.
4  In the initial steady state, the benefit at the initial retirement age    is a concave,
* j
piecewise linear function of average “covered” indexed earnings up through age    where
* 1, j -
the indexing adjusts the earnings at age  j  for aggregate wage growth between age  j  and
retirement and covered earnings at each age are the larger of actual earnings and    The kink 1. ij w +-
points in the benefit formula are calibrated to match those recently applicable in the U.S. system
and are assumed to be unchanged by any reforms of the system.  The replacement rates along the
three segments are 90 percent, 32 percent, and 15 percent, also in line with recent U.S. practice. 
The size of the social security system is measured by the contribution rate    and the three ,
s t
replacement rates are all adjusted upward or downward by the same proportion so that the
system’s budget balances period-by-period in the initial and terminal steady states. 
Government
Government in this economy has three functions.  First, it makes purchases of goods and
services equal to   per period.   is the amount corresponding to the balanced growth path t G t G
starting in the initial steady state and is unaffected by any subsequent changes to the social
security system.  Second, the government makes a lump-sum transfer payment (which in
principle could be negative) of    to each person alive at time  t.  This transfer payment is also t j
fixed at the amount implied by the balanced growth path starting in the initial steady state and is
unchanged thereafter.
5  Government finances these expenditures by imposing flat-rate taxes on9
consumption, labor income, and income from ordinary assets.  In addition, the government is
assumed to receive the ordinary assets of all individuals who die before the maximum age  J  and
as well as the assets held in mandatory retirement accounts of individuals who die before the
retirement age    Individuals beyond retirement age no longer hold retirement accounts, as the
*. j
balances have been used to purchase actuarially fair annuities.  In the event of premature death,
the assets used to finance these annuities go to the surviving annuity holders.
The government’s third function is to operate a pay-as-you-go social security system
financed by a flat-rate payroll tax on earnings up to    each period and paying retirement t w
benefits according to the formula described above.  In the steady state, aggregate social security
contributions equal aggregate benefits in each period.  During the transition from one steady state
to another, the system is permitted to run a surplus or deficit, with the difference between
contributions and benefits being made up from the general government budget.
The government’s one-period budget constraint is given by
1 (1)
cas
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where    denotes aggregate social security benefits and    is end-of-period government debt.  t B t D
Along a balanced growth path the debt grows at rate  g ,  the rate of growth of aggregate output. 
In addition, aggregate social security contributions and benefits are equal so that, omitting time
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In the initial steady state, the government sets all tax rates, the social security benefit level, and its
level of purchases.  The lump-sum transfer    is determined as a residual required to balance the j
budget.  In any subsequent steady state, purchases and transfers are set to the levels   and  G j
determined in the initial steady state.10
Production
Output is given by an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function
1 . tttt YAKL
aa - =
where    denote aggregate capital and labor, respectively, and    is total factor  and  tt KL t A
productivity, which is assumed to grow at a constant, exogenously given rate.  Factor markets are
















where   is the depreciation rate of capital. d
Experiments
The economy begins in an initial steady state in which there are no mandatory retirement
accounts, i.e.,   but with an unfunded social security system characterized by a 0,
p t =
contribution rate     At the end of period  t = 0  the government unexpectedly announces a
0 0.
s t ‡
policy change to take effect in the subsequent period.  In each experiment, the social security
contribution rate is immediately set to a new, lower long-run level  which is zero in the case of ,
s t ¥
complete privatization of the system and positive in the case of partial privatization.  In addition,
a system of mandatory individual accounts is established along the lines described above.
This policy change will eventually lead to a new steady state which can be characterized
fairly simply and to a transition which can take a wider range of possible forms.  In the new
steady state, the replacement rates along all segments of the social security benefit formula are
adjusted downward in the same proportion so that aggregate contributions once again equal
aggretate benefits.  The debt-GDP ratio may be different in the new steady state than in the old. 6  Under partial privatization the adjustment in the replacement rates is only approximately equal to the ratio
of the tax rates because the change in regime in general results in an endogenous change in hours and earnings.  The
flat-rate payroll tax implies that aggregate social security contributions are always proportional to aggregate covered
earnings.  Because of of the concavity of the benefit formula, however, this strict proportionality does not hold for
benefits, thus necessitating a further adjustment of the replacement rates if aggregate benefits are to equal aggregate
contributions in the new steady state. 
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In addition, at least one tax rate (other than the social security contribution rate) will generally
have to differ from that in the initial steady state.  This is fairly clear from the steady-state
government budget constraint for the case in which the new level of debt differs from the old, but
it is true more generally because of endogenous responses of consumption, work effort, and asset
holdings that affect the amount of revenue collected at the original tax rates.  For simplicity,
attention will be restricted to new steady states in which only one of the tax rates differs from its
initial value.  These assumptions imply that the new steady state can be characterized by the new
values of the debt-GDP ratio, the contribution rates for social security and individual accounts,
and one of the other tax rates.  The first three of these are set exogenously by the government and
the last is determined endogenously so as to satisfy the government budget constraint.
The description of the transition is somewhat more complicated than that of the terminal
steady state.  The reduction in the social security payroll tax rate is assumed to apply to all
workers in period 1, thus immediately reducing the aggregate contributions used to pay benefits. 
Members of cohorts     are alive and retired in period 1.  They have been promised
* 2  to  2 Jj --
social security benefits determined by their earnings history under the old policy regime, and it is
assumed that the government continues to pay them benefits at least as large as those promised. 
Members of cohort 1 and later work only under the new policy regime.  Upon retirement, they
will collect an annuity  P  financed by their contributions to individual retirement accounts.  In
the case of partial social security privatiazation they will also collect social security benefits.  As
under the original regime, these benefits are determined as a piecewise linear function of average
indexed earnings over the working career.  Under the new regime, the replacement rate along





By the time they retire, members of cohorts   to 0 will have worked one or more
* 3 j -
periods under each of the two policy regimes.  Work under the new regime entitles them to an12
annuity that can be determined in a straightforward manner from their contributions to individual
retirement accounts.  A “baseline” social security benefit can be defined for each of these cohorts
by multiplying each of the replacement rates in the original benefit formula by the ratio of
average indexed contributions over the worker’s career to the average indexed contributions the
worker would have made (for a given lifetime earnings history) if the payroll tax rate had not
been lowered.  Here the indexing is for aggregate wage growth between the period the
contribution is made and retirement, just as with the indexing of earnings.  The baseline benefit
schedule is adjusted downward from one cohort to the next because each cohort has spent one
less period contributing at the initial, higher rate     than the previous cohort did.  It is assumed
0
s t
that the benefit paid to members of cohorts   to 0  is at least equal to this baseline benefit.
* 3 j -
These assumptions imply that the social security system runs a deficit during the
transition to the new steady state.  The government can finance these transition costs by
increasing general tax revenues and/or issuing additional public debt.  The government chooses a
debt-GDP ratio for the new steady state that may be higher than the initial ratio.  In most
experiments it is assumed to adjust one of the tax rates along the transition path so as to hit this
terminal debt ratio.  The chosen tax rate is assumed to remain unchanged until period    at 1, t
which point it jumps (generally upward).  The tax rate reaches its terminal steady-state value in
period     The size of the jump at     is determined by the terminal debt-GDP ratio.  The 2. t 1 t
adjustment between periods    and     is assumed to be linear, and additional time beyond    is 1 t 2 t 2 t
required for the economy to reach its final steady state.
3.  Calibration and Initial Steady State
The model is calibrated so that the initial steady state matches certain long-run features of
the U.S. economy.  The capital share parameter in the production function is set to 0.31 and the
depreciation rate to 0.044.  One model period is taken to be a year.  The annual growth rate of per
capita output is 1.65 percent and the rate of growth of population is 1.20 percent.  Age-specific
survival probabilities are taken from U.S. Life Tables.  The initial period of a model individual’s
life is assumed to correspond to a real-time age of 21, and the maximum possible life span  J  is7  See ⁄mrohoro￿lu, ⁄mrohoro￿lu, and Joines (1999) for a further justification of these parameter values.
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85, corresponding to a real-time age of 105.  Mandatory retirement is assumed to occur at model
age 45.
In the initial steady state, government purchases are set to 0.18 and the tax rates on
consumption, labor income, and income from ordinary assets are set to 5.5 percent, 20 percent,
and 40 percent, respectively.  The initial social security contribution rate is 10 percent and the
debt-GDP ratio is 0.40.
Given these technology and policy parameters, the preference parameter    is set to s
match labor input, while    is set to 2.0.  The subjective discount factor    and the initial level g b
of total factor productivity are set to give a capital stock of 2.52 and a value of 1.0 for output.
7
Figure 1 shows consumption, assets, and labor as functions of age in the initial steady
state.  The age-consumption profile has the same general shape as those identified from U.S. data. 
In particular, consumption exhibits a discontinuous drop at retirement similar to that documented
in a variety of studies of U.S. data and by Banks, Blundell, and Tanner (1998) for British data.  
4.  Comparing Terminal Steady States
Given that the goal of social security reform is long-run utility gains, it is worth
comparing the properties of the steady states associated with various alternative reforms before
analyzing the transitions in more detail.  As noted above, these new steady states can be
characterized by values of the debt-GDP ratio, the contribution rates to social security and
individual retirement accounts, and one of the general tax rates.  It can be seen from the steady-
state government budget constraint that, assuming the economy is dynamically efficient, an
increase in the debt-GDP ratio will require an increase in tax revenue to meet the higher debt-
service payments.  Even without an increase in the public debt, reforms of the sort considered
here generally require an increase in the consumption or income tax rates.  This is because these
reforms, which set up a system of mandatory, tax-exempt individual retirement accounts, tend to14
cause individuals to reduce their holdings of ordinary, taxable assests (⁄mrohoro￿lu, ⁄mrohoro￿lu,
and Joines, 1998) .  Thus, some tax rate must be raised to replace the lost revenue.
The first result of simulating such a complete or partial privatization of social security is
that it is not desirable to impose a higher tax rate on income from ordinary assets in the new
steady state.  In fact, it may be impossible to raise this tax rate sufficiently to generate the
required revenue.  For example, Figure 2 shows steady-state Laffer curves for two privatization
experiments, one with   (partial privatization) and another with  0.02 and 0.08
ps tt ¥¥ ==
 (full privatizaton).  The vertical axis shows combined revenue from the 0.06 and 0.00
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taxes on consumption, labor income, and ordinary assets as a function of the asset tax rate,
holding constant the other two tax rates.  The figure indicates that the revenue-maximizing tax
rate is actually lower than the value of 40 percent assumed in the initial steady state.
A second general result is that raising the additional revenue required in the terminal
steady state through the consumption tax yields higher utility than increasing the labor income
tax.  Figure 3 shows the utility gain in the terminal steady state at various terminal debt-GDP
ratios for a particular privatization experiment in which    The utility
s 0.06 and 0.04.
p tt ¥¥ ==
gain is expressed as a percentage increase in consumption at all ages along the initial balanced
growth path.  Regardless of whether the consumption tax or the labor income tax is used to
generate the required additional revenue, a higher debt-GDP ratio leads to a smaller capital stock
and implies a higher tax ratre, thus resulting in lower welfare in the new steady state.  At any
debt-GDP ratio, use of the consumption tax results in higher utility than does raising the labor
income tax.  Consequently, attention will be confined to privatization experiments where only the
consumption tax rate is increased in the new steady state.
Figure 4 compares the utility gains in the new steady state resulting from three different
privatization experiments, two of which require  that    A debt-GDP ratio of 0 0.10.
pss ttt ¥¥ +==
0.4 in the terminal steady state, which is equal to that in the initial steady state, implies that all
transition costs are financed by higher tax revenue along the transition path.  The figure indicates
that a small, partial privatization with    lowers welfare in the new steady 0.02 and 0.08
ps tt ¥¥ ==
state even if none of the transition costs are financed by issuing new public debt.  Assets held in15
individual retirement accounts ultimately equal 40 percent of total assets that would have been
accumulated along the initial balanced growth path.  Ordinary assets fall by a slightly greater
amount, so that total assets are about 0.5 percent lower than initially.  Government revenue from
the asset tax falls by about 40 percent, requiring an increase in the consumption tax rate from 5.5
percent to 12.8 percent.  In the absence of a substantial increase in the capital stock, the
distortions caused by the higher consumption tax rate reduce welfare.
Figure 4 also shows the utility gains resulting from privatizations involving a 6-percent
contribution rate to private accounts.  These reforms are large enough to lead to substantial
increases in the capital stock, resulting in substantial utility gains in the case where none of the
transition costs are financed with public debt.  Furthermore, utility would increase in the new
steady state even with a fourfold increase in the debt-GDP ratio.  The utility gain is larger if
social security is eliminated entirely than if the two contribution rates are constrained to sum to
the original social security contribution rate of 0.10.  One reason for this is apparent in Figure 5,
which shows the age-consumption profiles associated with these two privatization experiments as
well as the profile for the initial balanced growth path.  Because assets held in retirement
accounts earn a return substantially above that on a worker’s implicit assets in the unfunded
social security system, individual accounts with a 6-percent contribution rate yield retirement
income roughly equal to that provided by social security with a 10-percent contribution rate (the
initial situation).  Private accounts lead to higher lifetime utility, however, because they require a
smaller sacrifice of consumption during working years.  Retaining unfunded social security on a
reduced scale leads to substantially higher retirement income than provided by the original
system and results in a sharp upward jump in consumption at retirement.  Individuals would like
to borrow against this retirement income but cannot do so.  The resulting allocation of
consumption over the life cycle is so skewed toward old age that it yields lower lifetime utilitly
than complete elimination of social security.  In addition, elimination of social security leads to a
25-percent increase in the capital stock, compared with a 22-percent increase if a small social
security system is retained.
Having established that complete or partial privatization of social security can increase
welfare in the new steady state, we now turn to the question of the effects on cohorts alive during
the transition.16
5.  Transition Effects
Figure 6 shows the transition to the new steady state for the complete privatization
experiment in which   and the terminal debt-GDP ratio is 1.0.  The top 0.06, 0.00,
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panel shows the consumption tax rate, which jumps upward from 5.5 percent to 19.0 percent at
time    and then decreases to its new steady-state value of 16.56 percent at    The 1 1 t = 2 100. t =
reduction in the payroll tax rate causes an immediate substitution away from leisure and toward
consumption of market goods.  Aggregate labor jumps upward by more than 10 percent before
settling at a new value about 8 percent higher than in the initial steady state.  Consumption jumps
upward by about 6 percent.  The net effect is an increases in saving, which causes the capital
stock to increase gradually to a value about 21 percent higher than in the initial steady state. 
Output is about 12.4 percent higher in the new steady state, and consumption is about 13.3
percent higher.
In the absence of any other change in taxes or transfers, the increase in the consumption
tax rate at time t1 would lower the welfare of retirees and workers close to retirement, all of whom
will collect benefits accrued under the old pension system.  In order to prevent such welfare
losses, the government is assumed to increase the pension benefits paid to transition generations
above the level accrued under the old system given their lifetime contributions.  The top panel of
Figure 7 shows the benefits accrued by each transition cohort under the old system as well as the
benefits actually paid.  These benefits begin at age 45 for cohorts not yet retired at time t1 and at
time t1 for those already retired, and they are expressed as a ratio to the benefits accrued that
would have been paid under the old system.  Cohorts already retired at the time of the policy
reform receive and immediate 30-percent increase in benefits.
The bottom panel of Figure 7 shows the effect of the pension reform on the lifetime
utility of various cohorts.  The effect on utility is expressed as a percentage change in
consumption at all remaining ages, with positive numbers denoting welfare gains.  The pension
reform described above either raises or holds constant the lifetime utility of all cohorts alive at the
time of the reform.  The welfare gain in the new steady state is about 5.8 percent of consumption. 
The welfare gains increase smoothly and monotonically from one cohort to the next for cohorts
born after time 0.  The pattern of welfare gains for cohorts alive at the time of the reform is an17
artifact of the pattern of benefits shown in the top panel and could be smoothed out by refining
these benefit payments. 
[Additional results to be reported.]
6.  Additional Experiments and Conclusions
[Experiments using U.S. rather than stationary demographics and considering distributional
effects.   To be written.]18
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(Debt/GDP Ratio = 0.40)
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Social Security Benefits of Transition Cohorts
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Figure 7